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Introduction  
The overlap between the cognitive and social sciences has significantly increased in recent decades. 
New disciplines and research programs have arisen and expanded at the intersection of these two types 
of sciences. They include cognitive sociology, political psychology, behavioral economics and new 
research programs in cognitive anthropology. However, not all social scientists have been persuaded 
that the social sciences should be integrated with the cognitive sciences. Some of them are indifferent 
to these new integrative disciplines and research programs, assuming that they are not relevant to their 
research practices.  Other social scientists consider them as overly reductionist and, thereby, as a threat 
to the identity of their disciplines. As a response, cognitive social scientists have provided arguments to 
convince all social scientists about the benefits of integrating the social sciences with the cognitive 
sciences. In this article, we analyze and evaluate these arguments for the cognitive social sciences. 
The cognitive social sciences can be defined as disciplines and research programs that aim to integrate 
the social sciences (e.g. sociology, anthropology, political science and economics) with the cognitive 
sciences (e.g. cognitive psychology, cognitive neuroscience and cognitive science). We understand 
interdisciplinary integration as an umbrella term that includes different ways of bringing scientific 
disciplines together and we separate different arguments for the cognitive social sciences on the basis 
of their underlying ideas about interdisciplinary integration. Although all cognitive social sciences focus 
on the cognitive aspects of social phenomena and relate themselves to the cognitive sciences, we do 
not require that the concept of cognition is defined in the same way in these integrative disciplines and 
research programs, nor do we require that they use similar research designs and methods.  
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More precisely, our aims are to reconstruct four arguments for the cognitive social sciences by 
specifying their premises, inferential structures and conclusions and to evaluate these arguments by 
analyzing their presuppositions, the plausibility of their premises, the soundness of their inferences and 
potential conceptual ambiguities. We focus on the arguments that seek to justify the need of the 
cognitive social sciences for social scientists but we do not discuss in detail the results of different 
research programs of cognitive social scientists. The arguments include deep differences regarding how 
the integration between the social and cognitive sciences is understood, resulting in different visions 
as to how the cognitive social sciences might look like. They do not, however, exhaust the list of 
arguments that have been provided for the cognitive social sciences. 
Although we are more interested in analyzing the arguments for the cognitive social sciences than 
mapping differences between them, different types of arguments reflect differences in cognitive social 
scientists’ presuppositions about the objects and methods of their research. Hence, in our analysis and 
evaluation of these arguments, we pay special attention to their ontological, methodological and 
theoretical presuppositions. Ontological presuppositions concern the nature and relations of cognitive 
and social phenomena. Methodological presuppositions deal with the preferable methods and 
explanatory strategies in the empirical studies of social phenomena. Theoretical presuppositions relate 
to the nature of acceptable explanatory theories and models about social phenomena. Since these 
presuppositions often remain implicit, one of our tasks is to identify and explicate them.1 
The following four sections are organized such that we first provide a concrete example of the argument 
under analysis. Although we have chosen our examples from the programmatic articles and books of 
cognitive social scientists, we admit that a single text may include more than one type of argument. We 
have selected our exemplary texts such that the type of argument that they illustrate is dominant in 
them. Then we reconstruct the structure of the argument in general terms. Each of these four sections 
ends with a brief discussion of the presuppositions of the argument under analysis and a critical 
                                                        
1 Hence, we agree with Gabe Ignatow (2014) and Omar Lizardo et al. (2019), who argue that cognitive and cultural 
sociologists should clarify their positions in relation to the key debates in philosophy of (social) science, and with Stephen 
Turner (2018), who emphasizes the importance of understanding the complexity of the philosophical issues that are raised 
by the idea of cognitive social science. 
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evaluation of its strengths and weaknesses. In the final discussion, we compare different types of 
arguments and identify the most compelling reasons why the cognitive social sciences are needed.  
Argument from explanatory grounding  
One of the pioneers of the cognitive social sciences, Ron Sun, begins his introduction to the book, 
Grounding Social Sciences in Cognitive Sciences, by claiming that cognitive explanations of social 
phenomena are often missing from the social sciences (Sun, 2012, p. 3). By cognitive explanation he 
means explanations that are based on the knowledge produced by the cognitive sciences. Then he 
argues that because “the cognitive sciences […] have made tremendous strides in recent decades” (p. 
4) and because “minds […] are the basis of social processes and phenomena” (p. 5), “the cognitive 
sciences may serve as a basis for the social sciences, in much the same way that physics provides 
grounding for chemistry or quantum mechanics provides grounding for classical mechanics” (p. 5). 
Hence, according to Sun, “taking cognition-psychology into serious consideration would be a 
reasonable step in trying to reach an in-depth, fundamental understanding of social phenomena” (p. 
5).  
Sun (2012) provides many examples in order to support his argument. For instance, he discusses 
explanatory studies on the influence of cognitive universals on various social and cultural phenomena, 
such as religion and language, and his own work on the CLARION cognitive architecture. The CLARION 
architecture draws on cognitive science and computational modeling to develop a comprehensive, 
empirically informed, and modularly structured architecture of the human mind that can be used to 
model various cognitive and social phenomena (e.g. Sun, 2017). Hence, according to Sun’s argument, 
cognitive social sciences are worth pursuing since they provide explanatory grounding for the social 
sciences and, thereby, deepen our understanding of social phenomena. 
Here is our reconstruction of Sun’s argument from explanatory grounding: 
1) Most social scientists do not currently make use of the knowledge produced in the cognitive 
sciences when they explain social phenomena.  
2) Cognitive processes are the ontological basis of social processes. 
3) Explanations in the cognitive sciences are deeper than explanations in the social sciences 
because they bottom out in cognitive processes. 
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4) If social scientists ground their explanations in the cognitive sciences, their explanations for 
social phenomena would become deeper than they are at present. 
5) Conclusion: the social sciences should be grounded in the cognitive sciences. 
It is important to recognize that Sun’s argument presupposes that the explanatory grounding relation 
between the cognitive and social sciences that is asymmetrical. This means that if the social sciences 
are grounded in the cognitive sciences, then the cognitive sciences cannot be grounded in the social 
sciences.  
Key premises 2 and 3 rest on the requirement that scientific explanations should reflect the ontological 
order of reality such that explanations of higher-level processes should be explained by the models that 
represent their lower-level component processes that form the ontological basis of the higher-level 
processes. Sun’s (2012) ontological views that support this requirement are based on a (non-
reductionist version of the) physicalist ontology or an emergent materialist ontology. The key 
assumption of this ontology is that higher-level social processes are dependent on but not reducible to 
the lower-level cognitive processes.2 Since Sun assumes that cognitive sciences study cognitive 
processes that are ontologically more fundamental than social processes studied in the social sciences, 
he expects that the cognitive sciences are capable of providing deeper explanations for social processes 
than those currently provided in the social sciences. He does not claim, however, that these cognitive 
explanations would explain social processes away (e.g. by means of ontologically reducing them to 
cognitive processes or eliminating them from scientific ontology). In other words, the idea of 
explanatory grounding of the social sciences in the cognitive sciences is compatible with the assumption 
that social processes have weakly emergent properties that can be mechanistically explained.  
To what extent does the argument from explanatory grounding provide compelling reasons that should 
convince social scientists for the need of the cognitive social sciences? It seems that most social 
                                                        
2 In metaphysics, the notion of supervenience is often used to elucidate the dependence relations between different level 
entities. The standard definition of supervenience requires that there can be no change in B-properties (the supervenient 
facts) without a corresponding change in A-properties (the supervenience base) (Kim, 2005). Nevertheless, more substantive 
way to clarify this relation is use the concept of emergence. For example, William Wimsatt’s (1997) notion of emergence as 
a failure of aggregativity of system-level properties is interesting in this respect. It is a weak concept of emergence in the 
sense that, in contrast to the strong concepts of emergence, it does not deny that emergent properties can be 
mechanistically explained.      
5 
 
scientists would probably agree with Sun’s observation that only a few social scientists presently rely 
on the cognitive sciences when they explain social phenomena. Nevertheless, one must accept 
conclusion 5 only if one accepts premises 2, 3 and 4 as true. Not all social scientists are convinced of 
the truth of these premises. We will review some reasons that they might use to question them. 
First of all, these premises imply that the influence of the cognitive sciences on the social sciences is 
unidirectional, since cognitive sciences are capable of providing deeper explanations to social processes 
than social sciences. Nevertheless, this idea of asymmetrical explanatory grounding may pose 
unnecessary constraints for the development of the cognitive sciences. We do not see any good a priori 
reasons to exclude the possibility that the social sciences might have something useful to offer to those 
parts of the cognitive sciences that address the cognitive aspects of social phenomena (even if one 
accepts that the social sciences study ontologically “less fundamental” processes than the cognitive 
sciences). Indeed, also Sun (e.g. 2012, pp. 18–23) seems to admit this. A proponent of the argument 
from explanatory grounding could try to cope with the previous counter-claim by granting that social 
sciences may be useful when it comes to providing accurate descriptions of social phenomena while 
demanding that cognitive sciences are needed to provide deep explanations to these phenomena (we 
will come back to this view below).  
Second, one way to motivate premises 2 and 3 is to assume that the human mind studied in the 
cognitive sciences is composed of the evolved modules that are, at least to a large extent, functionally 
specified, domain-specific, innate and essentially the same in all “normal adults” (e.g. Barkow, 
Cosmides & Tooby, 1992; Pinker, 2002; Sperber, 1996, Chapter 6).3 In this view, cognitive explanations 
for social phenomena are ontologically deeper than social scientific explanations precisely because the 
former explain social phenomena in terms of mental modules that are triggered in our modern 
environments that are partially different from those Pleistocene environments in which these modules 
originally evolved. These interacting mental modules of individuals are thereby assumed to provide the 
ontological basis for social processes. Also Sun’s (e.g. 2012, pp. 7, 11–14, 2017) CLARION-architecture 
                                                        
3 We recognize that the notions of mental module and innateness are both used in variety of different ways in the cognitive 
scientific literature, but we refrain from discussing these differences, because those cognitive social scientists who advocate 
the modular view of human mind often use these concepts without specifying their meanings. In addition, our arguments 
apply to the most popular variations of these concepts. 
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assumes that human mind is modular and that all humans have primary drives, but he does not seem 
to subscribe to the strongest versions of the so called “massive modularity theses” of the nativist 
evolutionary psychologists.  
Nevertheless, there is a growing number of cognitive scientists and philosophers of mind who reject 
the assumption that human minds are best understood in terms of the functionally specified modules 
whose development is (more or less) insensitive to the differences in the species-typical developmental 
environments of children and whose operations are not dependent on the broader material and social 
environments of embodied human action (e.g. Clark, 1997; Donald, 2001; Sterelny, 2003, 2012; Buller, 
2005; Franks, 2012; Karmiloff-Smith, 2015). Hence, at least the assumption that human mind is 
massively modular is highly controversial although there may be weaker versions of modularity that 
are less problematic.  
Despite the fact that some versions of the argument from explanatory grounding presuppose that 
human mind has a modular architecture that is largely innate, this assumption might not be necessary 
for this type of argument. But if we give up the modularity assumption, then we should acknowledge 
that the best explanations of some cognitive processes and capacities might include knowledge 
produced by the social sciences as they key elements. For example, if we want to explain how children 
learn to read and write, then instruction and social learning in particular types of material, institutional 
and symbolic environments would be among the key explanatory factors in addition to the cognitive 
scientific knowledge about those cognitive processes that take place in mind. One reason for this is that 
human children cannot have any innate mental modules for reading and writing due to the fact that 
there have not been enough time for such modules to evolve through natural selection.4 These 
considerations suggest that premise 3 should be modified to take into account the possibility of the 
two-way traffic between the cognitive and social sciences if we give up the assumption that human 
mind is composed of innate mental modules.  
                                                        
4 A defender of the modular view might argue that the lack of evolved mental modules for reading and writing as such does 
exclude the possibility that reading and writing skills may be understood in terms of the reconfiguration of innate mental 
modules for new purposes. Although this is possible, it should be emphasized here that in order to understand how this 




Finally, due to the facts that abstract ontologies―such as emergent materialism―are difficult to 
evaluate empirically and that Sun (2012) also supports premise 4 by reviewing cognitive scientific 
studies and theories that have been used to deepen our understanding of some social phenomena, the 
strength of his argument partly depends on the quality of these examples. Although this is not right 
place to analyze them in detail, it should be noted that a potential pitfall of this type of examples is that 
they may redefine the social phenomena under study in a way that many social scientists find 
unacceptable. For example, Pascal Boyer (2001) has argued that many religious phenomena can be best 
explained in terms of the operation of a hyperactive agency-detection module and the predisposition 
to remember “minimally counterintuitive representations”. Even if this provides a plausible cognitive 
explanation why religious beliefs with a specific type of content are highly contagious (we will not 
attempt to evaluate its scientific merits here), there are surely many institutional and cultural aspects 
of religion that remain unexplained, concerning religious doctrines, rituals, practices and organizations 
in a specific religious groups and their differences between different groups and times. 
Nevertheless, this argument that highlights the variability of social phenomena can be countered by 
claiming that social scientists have partially misidentified the social phenomena that require 
explanations by uncritically relying on our everyday accounts of these phenomena. Insofar as cognitive 
social scientists aim at providing scientific explanations for social phenomena (in contrast to more or 
less local interpretations), they should re-conceptualize their explanandum in a way that takes into 
account the cognitive scientific knowledge about universal and domain-specific mental modules 
through which humans form, transform, store and transmit representations (e.g. Sperber, 1996).  
It is important to recognize that this counter-argument is plausible only if we accept that human mind 
has a modular architecture that is largely innate. As discussed above, this assumption is highly 
controversial among cognitive scientists and philosophers of mind, not to mention its contentiousness 
among social scientists. Also the distinction between the scientific and interpretive methods, assumed 
in the above claim, is not accepted by all social scientists. Not even all cognitive social scientists would 
accept it, since some of them count interpretive (or qualitative) methods as scientific methods in 
addition to experimental, statistical and simulation methods (see Hutchins, 1995; Zerubavel, 1997; 
Bloch, 2012). Hence, we suggest that it should be judged in a case-by-case manner whether re-
conceptualizations of this kind are reasonable in the light of the aims of social scientific research.     
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Sun (2012) has not been the only cognitive social scientist who has appealed to the need for explanatory 
grounding of the social sciences in the cognitive sciences. Similar arguments have been presented by 
the advocates of the nativist program of evolutionary psychology (e.g. Barkow et al., 1992). For 
example, Steven Pinker’s (2002) attack against what he calls “the standard social science model”, and 
his argument for the nativist version of evolutionary psychology includes an attempt to ground social 
sciences in the cognitive sciences, although there are slight differences between Pinker’s notion of 
massively modular mind and that of Sun’s (e.g. 2017).  
Argument from theoretical unification 
Another argument for the integration between the social and cognitive sciences is provided by Herbert 
Gintis who emphasizes the importance of theoretical unification. He describes a set of disciplines as 
unified “if they are consistent, so that in cases where two disciplines deal with the same phenomena, 
their models are equivalent and synergic, each discipline being substantively enriched by the scientific 
content of the others” (Gintis, 2004, p. 37). Gintis (2007, p. 1) says that the unity of the behavioral 
sciences requires that they have “a common underlying model, enriched in different ways to meet the 
particular needs of each discipline.” The behavioral sciences, which include economics, anthropology, 
sociology, psychology, political science as well as biological research on human and animal behavior, 
are not unified in this way even though they all deal with the phenomena of decision-making and 
strategic interaction (Gintis, 2012, p. 415). Gintis contrasts the disunified array of the behavioral 
sciences with the more mature state of physics, chemistry and astronomy, which “achieved unity with 
the development of quantum mechanics, elementary particle and solid-state physics, and the big bang 
model of the universe” (Gintis, 2004, p. 37). 
Gintis (2012, p. 415) traces the disunified state of the behavioral sciences to the three incompatible 
models of human behavior that they employ: biological, economic and sociological. The biological 
model ”is that of the fitness maximizer, who is the product of a long process of Darwinian evolution”  
(p. 415). The sociological model describes ”the pliant individual who internalizes the norms and values 
of society and behaves according to the dictates of the social roles he occupies” (p. 415). The economic 
model is based on “rational choice theory, which takes the individual as maximizing a self-regarding 
preference subject to an unanalyzed and pre-given set of beliefs, called subjective priors” (p. 415).  
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Gintis (2012, p. 415) contends that “all three are flawed, but can be modified to produce a unified 
framework for modeling choice and strategic interaction for all of the behavioral sciences through a 
considered appreciation of the evolved nature of human psychology” (see also Gintis, 2009). 
Gintis (2012) draws on five general principles in order to unify the behavioral sciences. First, there is 
gene-culture coevolution, according to which “human cognitive, affective, and moral capacities are the 
product of an evolutionary dynamic involving the interaction of genes and culture” (p. 419). Second, 
there is the socio-cultural theory of norms, which “includes fundamental insights from sociology that 
apply to all forms of human social organization, from hunter-gatherer to advanced technological 
societies” (p. 416). Third, there is game theory as the general theory of “strategic interaction, in which 
the behavior of agents is derived by assuming that each is choosing a best response to the actions of 
other agents” (p. 428). Fourth, there is the rational actor model, which provides partial foundations for 
behavioral, epistemic and evolutionary game theory by assuming that individuals have consistent 
preferences which “can be represented by a numerical function [….] which the individual maximizes 
subject to his subjective beliefs” (p. 424). In contrast to its traditional version, Gintis’ (2012, pp. 417, 
423–426; also Gintis, 2007, 2009) updated version of the rational actor model relaxes the assumptions 
that rational actors must be perfectly informed and that their preferences must be self-regarding. Fifth, 
there is complexity theory which “is needed because human society is a complex adaptive system with 
emergent properties that cannot now, and perhaps never will be, explained starting with more basic 
units of analysis” (Gintis, 2012, p. 418).  
Although he lists five principles for unifying the behavioral sciences, the third and the fourth principle 
are the main elements of the unified modeling framework that Gintis (2007a, 2009, 2012) proposes for 
those areas of the behavioral sciences that overlap with each other. He states that “[t]he rational actor 
model is the single most important analytical construct in the behavioral sciences operating at the level 
of individual” (Gintis, 2012, p. 417) and that “[g]ame theory is a general lexicon that applies to all life 
forms” (Gintis, 2009, p. 45) and, thereby, “fosters a unified analytical framework available to all 
behavioral sciences” (Gintis, 2009, p. 45). Complexity theory is left out from this modeling framework, 
but this omission is not surprising given the fact that the fifth principle was added to Gintis’ original 
principles as a response to his critics (see Gintis, 2007b, p. 45). For this reason, it is only loosely 
connected to his other principles. He also added the socio-cultural theory of norms later to the list of 
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unifying principles since it is missing from the list of principle provided in Gintis (2007b, p. 45). Gintis 
(e.g. 2012, p. 432–433) conceptualizes norms in terms of the updated rational actor model and game 
theory, meaning that the second principle is subordinated to the third and the fourth principle. 
Our reconstruction of Gintis’s argument from theoretical unification is as follows: 
1) Scientific disciplines that study the same domain of phenomena should be conceptually and 
theoretically unified with one another. 
2) The behavioral sciences all study the same domain of phenomena, which have to do with the 
decision-making and strategic interaction. 
3) Hence, the behavioral sciences ought to be unified with one another. 
4) Unification of the behavioral sciences requires a unified framework for modeling decision-
making and strategic interaction in a way that takes into account the contributions of different 
behavioral sciences.  
5) Conclusion: The rational actor model and game theory, when modified to take into account the 
evolved nature of human psychology and the socio-cultural theory of norms, provide a unified 
modeling framework for the behavioral sciences. 
Premises 1 and 3 may at first be regarded as obvious, if one takes the comparison that Gintis  draws 
between the currently disunified state of the behavioral sciences and the more unified state of the 
mature natural sciences (i.e. physics, chemistry and astronomy) seriously. However, many philosophers 
of science, such as John Dupré (1993) and Nancy Cartwright (1999), have argued that even “mature 
natural sciences” are not theoretically nor ontologically as unified as it may seem at first sight. 
Moreover, social epistemologists have argued that a diversity of perspectives on the world is essential 
for scientific progress both in the natural sciences and in the social sciences (e.g. Weisberg & Muldoon, 
2009). There are also additional reasons to resist the conclusion that the behavioral sciences (including 
the social sciences) ought to be theoretically unified with one another, even if one accepts this claim 
for the mature natural sciences. For example, it has been argued that theories in the social sciences as 
well as in some areas of biology are essentially value-laden, and may involve conflicting power relations 
and political ideologies, and therefore a diversity of different points of view is essential for the these 
sciences (Longino, 1990, 2013). These reasons indicate that we should treat Gintis’s unificationist 
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agenda with caution, regardless of whether we take the behavioral sciences to be fundamentally 
different from the mature natural sciences with respect to their methods or objects of study. 
Premise 2 should be read with the understanding that most research programs in the behavioral 
sciences concern some specific domain in which human behavior and interaction takes place—for 
example, the family, the workplace, the markets or the tribe—rather than the social world as a whole. 
The piecemeal character of social scientific research practice does not go entirely unnoticed by Gintis 
insofar as his aim is “to render models of human behavior from different disciplines compatible where 
they overlap” (Gintis, 2012, p. 416). Nevertheless, in addition to this modest account of unification in 
terms of compatibility between overlapping disciplines, which does not seem to require a unified 
modeling framework, Gintis presents stronger claims regarding the roles of rational actor model and 
game theory in the theoretical unification of the behavioral sciences that are described in premise 4.  
Gintis’ argument from theoretical unification is likely to raise the charge of economics imperialism (see 
Mäki, 2009) among social scientists, due to the central role that the rational actor model plays in his 
unified modeling framework and his principles for unifying the behavioral sciences. Indeed, four of the 
five principles that Gintis proposes are at least partly parasitical on the rational actor model. The axioms 
of rational choice provide the foundation for both game theory and the socio-cultural theory of norms, 
which Gintis (2012, p. 432) understands through the game-theoretic notion of correlated equilibrium. 
Moreover, gene-culture evolution is applied by way of evolutionary game theory, and complexity 
theory seems to play a role only as a leftover category that is there to incorporate whatever the rational 
actor model and game theory cannot explain, as the social world may include “emergent properties 
cannot be derived analytically from lower-level constructs” (Gintis, 2012, p. 416). Hence, although he 
discusses many topics in his papers, the unifying work in Gintis’ argument from unification is done by 
the revised versions of rational actor model and game theory, both of which have been most influential 
in the neoclassical economics. The central role that they play in Gintis’s unificationist agenda for the 
behavioral sciences is unlikely to make it appeal to many social scientists (but see Hechter & Kanazawa, 
1997), who may perceive it as a thinly veiled attempt at forcing all social sciences to succumb under the 
imperialist rule of economics.  
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The rational actor model and game theory, combined with the relatively speculative use of some of the 
evolutionary principles that Gintis proposes, also raise concerns about their compatibility with empirical 
results of the cognitive sciences and the potential untestability of his axiomatic assumptions (e.g. 
Turner, 2018, pp. 31–35). Gintis (2007a, 2007b, 2009) anticipates these worries and aims to show that 
all cognitive scientists, psychologists and behavioral economists, who reject the rational actor model 
and game theory, are wrong5 and that this model can be supported by neuroscientific evidence. 
Nevertheless, the neuroscientific evidence that Gintis (e.g. 2007b, p. 5) provides is controversial (see 
Fumagalli, 2013). Many of Gintis’ (e.g. 2007a, pp. 4, 9–15) answers to those critiques that cognitive 
scientists and psychologists have raised against the assumptions of rational actor model are question 
begging in the sense that he tends to explain away empirical evidence that questions the rational actor 
model by claiming that it results from “performance errors” of individuals that are not supposed to 
question their rationality that he tends to identify with the axiomatic assumption of preference 
consistency. In addition, many philosophers of science (e.g. Buller, 2005; Dupré, 2001) have also 
criticized evolutionary psychological accounts of innate or evolved human nature that is assumed in 
Gintis (e.g. 2007a, pp. 15–16) arguments.  
For these reasons, it is not at all clear whether Gintis’ principles and assumptions form an internally 
coherent whole and whether they are compatible with the findings of the cognitive sciences. Since he 
provides few examples of where his unified modelling framework for the behavioral sciences have been 
successfully applied to unify social scientific theories, it is also ultimately left to the reader to figure out 
whether it is appropriate for the purposes of integrating the social sciences with the cognitive sciences. 
A very different and more implicit example of the argument from theoretical unification can be found 
in discursive psychology (e.g. Edwards & Potter, 1992). The key idea of this research program is to argue 
that, instead of focusing on mental states and cognitive processes of individuals, psychological 
phenomena should be studied as social or linguistic constructions that people use to accomplish social 
                                                        
5 Gintis, for example, defends behavioral game theory by claiming that “[b]ecause one cannot do behavioral game theory, 
by which I mean the application of game theory to the experimental study of human behavior, without assuming preference 
consistency, we must accept this axiom to avoid the analytical weaknesses of the behavioral disciplines that reject the BPC 
model, including psychology, anthropology, and sociology” (Gintis, 2009, p. 2). Letters BPC refer to Beliefs, Preferences and 
Constraints and the BPC model is another name that Gintis’ gives to his revised version of the rational actor model. The 
previous claim boils down to a view that unified modeling frameworks are better than other explanatory approaches in the 
social and cognitive sciences. 
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actions in specific situations. Discursive psychologists are agnostic about the existence of mental states 
apart from the uses of mental and cognitive terms in everyday discourses. Accordingly, they suggest 
that the proper method to study psychological phenomena of this kind is to use discourse analysis. If 
Gintis’s argument is an instance of economics imperialism, then discursive psychology may be 
understood as an instance of sociological imperialism since it uses sociological theories and methods to 
unify psychology and sociology. One problem with discursive psychology is that it refuses to make a 
distinction between our ways of speaking about cognitive processes and the cognitive processes and 
mechanisms that actually generate our actions and interactions. Thereby, it ends up rejecting nearly all 
cognitive scientific research. 
Argument from constraints 
On the first page of his Anthropology and the Cognitive Challenge, Maurice Bloch (2012) states that 
“cognitive issues are not on the periphery of such social sciences as anthropology, history or sociology” 
(p. 1). Instead of being peripheral concerns, cognitive issues “are relevant and helpful for the most 
central and familiar topics which, among others, cultural and social anthropologist deal with” (p. 1).  
According to Bloch (p. 7), anthropologists and other social scientists end up doing cognitive 
anthropology “as soon as they claim to represent knowledge of those they study, as soon as they try to 
explain actions of people in terms of that knowledge, as soon as they warn general public, or each 
other, of the dangers of ethnocentrism, as soon as they discuss the extent, or the limits, of cultural 
variability.” In his view, then, social scientists cannot escape from making assumptions about the 
cognition of their research subjects. The question is: where do these assumptions come from? 
Bloch’s (2012, p. 8) answer is that the cognitive assumptions of anthropologist and other social 
scientists are often based on “the hazy cognitive theories of folk wisdom, their own and those of the 
people they study”. Then he points out that one of the main contributions of the cognitive sciences has 
been to question the folk theories of this kind (pp. 8–9). Many social scientist, however, are not only 
ignorant of this fact but also fail to distinguish between (i) what their research subjects say about their 
cognition when they are interviewed or observed by using participant observation and (ii) the cognitive 
mechanisms that actually generate their actions and practices (pp. 11, 215–216). Hence, social 
scientists, according to Bloch, need cognitive sciences to make a distinction between (i) and (ii) and, 
14 
 
thereby, to question their own and their research subjects’ folk assumptions about cognition (pp. 11, 
107–116).  
Bloch (2012, Chapters 7–8) strengthens these points by indicating that cognitive scientists have found 
that many action-related cognitive processes are unconscious, automatic and fast. This means that the 
research subjects of social scientists cannot be aware of these processes nor of their influence on their 
actions and interactions. Although he grants that some traditions in the social sciences, such as the so-
called “practice theories” of Pierre Bourdieu and Anthony Giddens, recognize the significance of implicit 
cognitive processes for social interactions, Bloch (2012, 149–154) maintains that the cognitive sciences 
are needed to analyze these processes empirically and to constrain social scientists assumptions about 
them. This point links his argument to Omar Lizardo and Stephen Turner’s debate about whether 
assumptions about implicit cognitive processes in practice theories are compatible with recent findings 
in cognitive neuroscience (see Lizardo, 2007; Turner, 2007). 
Despite his criticisms of the background assumptions of social scientists from the viewpoint of the 
cognitive sciences, Bloch’s (2012) aim is not to completely alter the research practices and methods of 
the social sciences. Rather, he draws on cognitive sciences in order to constrain the cognitive 
assumptions of social scientists that underlie the way in which they interpret their data and formulate 
their research questions. He also emphasizes that the ethnographic studies of anthropologists produce 
such data about social phenomena that cannot be produced by means of experimental studies of 
cognitive scientists. Hence, not only should social scientists’ assumptions about cognitive phenomena 
be constrained by the results of the cognitive sciences but also cognitive scientists’ assumptions about 
social phenomena should be constrained by the robust results of the social sciences. Although Bloch’s 
book is not targeted to cognitive scientists, the idea of mutual constraints between the cognitive and 
the social sciences is included in his arguments. In what follows, we focus on his ideas as to how the 
cognitive sciences should be taken into account in the social sciences. 
Bloch’s argument from constraints can be reconstructed as follows: 
1) Since all social processes involve cognitive aspects, social scientists must make assumptions 
about human cognition in their research practices. 
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2) Social scientists’ assumptions about the cognitive processes of their research subjects are often 
based on the subjects’ own accounts of these processes and/or the ideas and concepts of “folk 
psychology” that people use in their everyday life. 
3) Cognitive scientific studies have convincingly demonstrated that our cognitive processes are not 
transparent to us and that our own understanding of these processes, including social scientists’ 
and their research subjects “folk psychological theories”, is limited and sometimes misleading.  
4) Conclusion: social scientists assumptions about cognitive processes of their research subjects 
should be constrained by the results of cognitive sciences. 
This argument includes much less ontological, methodological and theoretical presuppositions than the 
argument from explanatory grounding and the argument from theoretical unification. For example, 
instead of celebrating the progress of the cognitive sciences, Bloch (2012, p. 9) holds that “the study of 
cognition is in its infancy” and that, for this reason, “the cognitive sciences are more certain when telling 
us what things are not like, than when telling us how things are” (p. 9). Accordingly, the main purpose 
of Bloch’s argument is to weed out implausible cognitive assumptions from the social sciences rather 
than to ground the social sciences in the cognitive sciences or to unify the social sciences with the help 
of the cognitive sciences.  
We think that all of the premises of the above argument are well justified. Indeed, cognitive scientists 
have convincingly demonstrated not only that our everyday conceptions about how our minds work 
are seriously limited and potentially misleading but also that a large part of our action-related cognitive 
processes are implicit (e.g. Evans & Frankish, 2009; Kahneman, 2011). We also agree with the 
conclusion 4 to the extent that social scientists studying small-scale social interactions are well-advised 
to pay attention to the results of cognitive sciences when they make assumptions about the cognitive 
processes of their research subjects since this enables them to avoid biased explanations. This does not 
mean, however, that social scientists should replace their methods with the methods of cognitive 
sciences, since, as Bloch (2012) rightly argues, ethnographic methods can be used to produce such data 
about social and cultural phenomena that is impossible to obtain by using the experimental and 
simulation methods of cognitive scientists (see also Hutchins, 1995). What it does mean is that the data 
social scientists produce by using ethnographic methods should not be interpreted as providing reliable 
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knowledge about the internal cognitive processes of their research subjects and that, for many 
explanatory purposes, it should be supplemented with data acquired by using other type of methods. 
Nevertheless, it can be argued that the results of cognitive sciences are less significant when it comes 
to explanatory studies on the outcomes of social interactions of a large number of individuals in a 
specific institutional context. For example, a defender of a rational choice theory might argue that 
abstractions and idealizations regarding the cognitive processes of individuals are needed to model 
those social mechanisms that generate the aggregate outcomes of a large number of interacting 
individuals in the context of markets, representative democracies or the systems of higher education. 
The reason is that the “cognitively realist” models of these complex interactions tend to become either 
intractable or so complex that it would be impossible to understand them. In addition, it has been 
argued that “the institutional scaffolds” that are external to individuals but constraint their choices may 
be the most important explanatory factors in cases of this kind, meaning that the explanatory power of 
rational choice models may ultimately reside in these institutional scaffolds rather than in the 
assumptions about those cognitive or neural processes that are internal to individuals (Clark, 1997, pp. 
181–184; cf. Gintis, 2007a). 
Although this is not right place to evaluate the vices and virtues of rational choice theory, or its different 
versions and interpretations, we contend that social scientists cannot escape from making trade-offs 
between the psychological realism and the tractability of their models in this context. The feasibility of 
their assumptions about cognition should be judged in a case-by-case manner that takes into account 
the purposes in which they use their models. However, in order to be able make judgements of this 
kind, social scientists should be aware of the relevant cognitive processes that they abstract from or 
idealize in their models. To this end, they need cognitive sciences (for an insightful discussion of these 
topics, see Lizardo, 2009). 
Similar arguments that highlight the constraints that the robust findings of cognitive sciences should 
impose on social scientists’ background assumptions about cognition and culture have been developed, 
among others, by Paul DiMaggio (1997), Mark Turner (2001), Karen Cerulo (2009) and Lizardo, 
Sepulvado, Stoltz & Taylor (2019). All of them review theories and research results of the cognitive 
sciences and show how they have been (or should be) taken into account by social scientists in different 
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research fields and how they can be used to formulate new research questions. In their view, the 
influence of the cognitive sciences on the social sciences is mediated via empirical studies on specific 
social phenomena. These studies might also provide new avenues for developing research programs 
that would aim at deeper integration of the findings, methods and theories of these disciplines.  
Argument from complementarity 
The idea of complementarity can be understood as an epistemological principle according to which a 
single perspective cannot provide comprehensive descriptions and explanations of the specific domain 
of phenomena. A classic example of the complementarity principle is Niels Bohr’s claim that objects 
studied in physics include both particle and wave aspects that cannot be measured at the same time 
nor represented by using a single theoretical model. In this section, we address the argument according 
to which cognitive science and cognitive sociology are complementary perspectives. It is presented by 
Eviatar Zerubavel in his book Social Mindscapes: An Invitation to Cognitive Sociology that was published 
in 1997. 
Zerubavel’s (1997, Chapter 1) key argument is that cognitive science should be complemented with a 
perspective that falls between two extremes: cognitive universalism and cognitive individualism. The 
expression “cognitive universalism“ characterizes the perspective of cognitive science which aims to 
uncover the universal attributes of human cognition (e.g. How human memory works? How many 
pieces of information can be held in short-term memory?). The expression “cognitive individualism” 
characterizes a perspective that considers every individual mind to be unique. It is difficult to find a 
scientific illustration of cognitive individualism. Zerubavel himself suggests psychoanalysis, but 
cognitive individualism could be better understood as a kind of folk understanding of human mind. The 
additional perspective between these extremes is cognitive sociology. Zerubavel uses the expression 
“sociomental” as a shorthand for the aspects of cognition that are studied in this complementary 
perspective.  
As a rough definition, cognitive phenomena that are attributed to a certain group or culture can be 
regarded as sociomental (Zerubavel, 1993, p. 398). For example, memory has sociomental aspects, such 
as the differences how different groups remember the same event from nation’s history (Zerubavel, 
1997, Chapter 6). Also socially shared interpretive frameworks and social norms that constrain 
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perception and focus attention belong to the domain of sociomental – e.g. how social scientists look at 
the world or how different groups look at abstract art (Zerubavel, 1997, Chapters 2–3). Although it 
seems that the boundaries of cognitive sociology that studies sociomental phenomena are quite fuzzy, 
the core feature of this perspective is that it “complements the work of cognitive scientists by showing 
that we think not only as human beings but also as social beings located in particular cultures and 
subcultures, and belonging to particular ‘thought communities.” (Brekhus, 2007, p. 450; see also 
Zerubavel, 1997, 5). 
Cognitive sociology is historically rooted in the sociology of knowledge. Especially Simmel, Mannheim, 
Goffman, Berger and Luckmann are sociologists whose work has influenced on cognitive sociology 
(Brekhus, 2007, pp. 449–542). Therefore, Zerubavel’s version of cognitive sociology also has close 
relationship with the tradition of social constructionism. Although his way of understanding cognitive 
sociology could result in adversary between cognitive science and cognitive sociology – or naturalism 
and social constructionism – Zerubavel aims to avoid it by considering the relationship between these 
disciplines as epistemically symmetrical, in the sense that none of the disciplines studying the different 
aspects of human cognition should be privileged over others.  
Zerubavel suggests that cognitive sociology is important for the multilevel study of mind since “[i]n 
focusing specifically on the third, intermediate level, cognitive sociology helps widen [the limited scope 
of cognitive universalism and individualism] as well as avoid the reductive tendencies normally 
associated with those two extremes” (Zerubavel, 1997, p. 113). Hence, it serves as a critique of 
“reductionism” that is sometimes connected to cognitive universalism. Cognitive sociology also has a 
constructive side since Zerubavel (1997, p. 113) considers it as a contribution to the development of 
“an integrative, multilevel approach to cognition that views us both as individuals, as human beings, 
and as social beings.”  
In addition to its focus on cognitive variation, cognitive sociology aims to complement cognitive science 
by focusing on the moral and political aspects of cognition and by utilizing qualitative/interpretative 
methods (e.g. Brekhus, 2015). For example, the political aspects of cognition are involved when some 
artist is classified to be lowbrow in order to sustain prevailing hierarchies in the art world, or when 
there are different ways how a certain moment in some nation’s history is remembered that each serve 
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particular interests. Cognitive sociologists study these and other social aspects of cognitive processes 
by using mostly qualitative/interpretative methods, such as interviewing and document analysis (e.g. 
Vaughan, 2002) as well as ethnography (e.g. Brekhus, 2003).  
This is our reconstruction of Zerubavel’s argument from complementarity:  
1) Since cognitive science studies cognitive universals, it cannot answer questions about how 
cognition varies between groups and how social environments affect cognitive processes.  
2) In order to provide a more comprehensive understanding of human cognition, cognitive science 
should be complemented with studies that answer questions concerning the domain of 
sociomental.  
3) Cognitive sociology’s ontological, theoretical and methodological position allows it to answer 
questions concerning the domain of sociomental.  
4) Conclusion: Cognitive science should be complemented with cognitive sociology.  
The argument from complementarity is based on a view that human cognition is an object that is 
studied by many disciplines that produce knowledge according to their distinct ontological and 
epistemological commitments. The immediate goal is not to integrate (in a strong sense) these 
disciplines but rather to produce complementary knowledge about cognition. Hence, although the 
shared object of study in these disciplines is human cognition, the knowledge is always tied to the 
discipline which produced it. The relationship between different disciplines may be described as 
epistemically symmetrical: they all have the same object of study, but none of them have privilege over 
it. 
The argument from complementarity may be quite compelling to some social scientists since premises 
2 and 3 claim that cognitive sociology has unique perspective for studying human cognition and should 
be therefore included in the group of disciplines that study cognition. If social scientists are worried 
about the identity of their discipline, this argument can be used to strengthen this identity, since it 
claims that without social scientific perspective the study of cognition remains incomplete. 
Nevertheless, more significant challenge to the argument from complementarity is that it needs to 




One problem with this argument that is reflected in premise 1 is that it is based on a quite narrow 
understanding of the cognitive sciences. It seems to ignore how cognitive sciences have moved away 
from a nearly exclusive focus on “the universal foundations of human cognition” (Zerubavel, 1997, p. 
3), and included wider perspectives on human cognition that focus on the embodied, embedded, 
enactive, materially extended, situated, socially distributed and cultural-historical aspects of cognitive 
processes (e.g. Hutchins, 1995; Clark, 1997; Franks, 2011; Lizardo et al., 2019; Milkowski et al., 2018; 
Turner, 2018). Although studies on “wide cognition” were in their infancy in 1990’s, when Zerubavel 
first developed his argument from complementarity, it seems to us that these wider perspectives tend 
to be ignored in more recent discussion in Zerubavellian cognitive sociology as well (e.g. Brekhus, 2015). 
Hence, we suggest that the argument from complementarity needs to be updated by taking into 
account of these new perspectives. When this is done, it is not at all clear whether the revised argument 
can be regarded as a distinct type of argument from the other arguments for the cognitive social 
sciences that we have analyzed above. 
Other problem with the argument from complementarity concerns the kind of interdisciplinarity it 
would produce in practice. Omar Lizardo (2014), for example, argues that the sociology of culture and 
cognition, often used as a synonym of cognitive sociology, creates “a sense of pseudo-
interdisciplinarity”. This means that, although the name suggests at least some degree of 
interdisciplinary interaction, there actually is minimal communication between the disciplines. It seems 
to us that all attempts to create complementary perspectives to cognitive science are at risk of falling 
into the trap of pseudo-interdisciplinarity of this kind. Hence, although interdisciplinary integration is 
regarded as an ultimate goal of the multilevel approach to cognition in some of Zerubavel’s (e.g. 1997, 
p. 113) claims, we may ask if the argument from complementary actually leads away from this goal. 
Discussion and conclusions 
To recapitulate the main points of the above discussions, we have analyzed four different types of 
arguments for integrating the social sciences with the cognitive sciences: the argument from 
explanatory grounding, the argument from theoretical unification, the argument from constraints, and 
the argument from complementarity. The argument from explanatory grounding was exemplified by 
the reasons that Ron Sun provides for using cognitive scientific knowledge as a basis for building 
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explanations for social phenomena. The argument from theoretical unification was illustrated by 
Herbert Gintis’s proposal to unify behavioral science with the revised versions of the rational actor 
model and game theory. The argument from constraints was exemplified by Maurice Bloch’s views 
according to which social scientists must make assumptions about the cognition of their research 
subjects, and these assumptions ought to be constrained by the findings of the cognitive sciences. And 
the argument from complementarity was exemplified by Eviatar Zerubavel’s approach to cognitive 
sociology which studies variation in cognition between groups and cultures in a way that is taken to 
complement the traditional cognitive science. We organized the arguments in sequence such that the 
argument from explanatory grounding (which we discussed first) is the strongest form of 
interdisciplinary integration between the cognitive and the social sciences, while the argument from 
complementarity (which we discussed last) is the weakest one. In what follows, we briefly compare 
these arguments by analyzing their presuppositions concerning how social phenomena can be made 
understandable in scientific terms. 
The argument from explanatory grounding can be naturally combined with the mechanistic approach 
to scientific explanation. The fundamental insight underlying the mechanistic approach is that many 
“special sciences” (e.g. the biosciences, the cognitive sciences and at least some parts of the social 
sciences) track causal mechanisms that produce, underlie, enable or maintain specific types of empirical 
phenomena (e.g. Bechtel, 2008; Craver & Darden, 2013). Accordingly, the argument from explanatory 
grounding claims that social sciences should be grounded in the cognitive sciences because the latter 
provide knowledge about those cognitive mechanisms that underlie and enable social phenomena. 
Although the argument from explanatory grounding was exemplified with Sun’s CLARION architecture, 
the mechanistic approach to explanation does not require that those cognitive mechanisms that 
underlie and enable social phenomena have to be universal and modular. Nor does it require that all 
cognitive mechanisms have to be internal to individuals (e.g. Miłkowski et al., 2018). 
The argument from theoretical unification presupposes the unification approach to explanation. The 
traditional version of this approach maintains that “science increases our understanding of the world 
by reducing the total number of independent phenomena that we have to accept as ultimate or given” 
(Friedman, 1974, 15). The unification approach to explanation does not require that unifying 
explanations of social phenomena should be provided in terms of cognitive mechanisms. Rather, it 
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suggests that we need a unifying theoretical framework that can be used to explain both social and 
cognitive phenomena. This is precisely what Gintis aims to achieve by his updated versions of the 
rational actor model and game theory that he provides as a unified modeling framework for the 
behavioral sciences, including the overlapping areas of the cognitive and social sciences. In other words, 
the unification approach implies a “top-down” view of interdisciplinary integration since it emphasizes 
the need to fit phenomena studied in different disciplines within a general theoretical framework in 
order to understand them while the mechanistic approach is more “bottom-up” view due to the fact 
that it highlights the need to study causal mechanisms that underlie and enable specific types of 
phenomena in order to understand them (cf. Kitcher, 1985).  Although some advocates of the 
unification approach consider it as an explication of causal explanations, we think that many 
explanations that may be said to theoretically unify phenomena are not causal explanations. For 
example, explanations in terms of game theoretical equilibria do not explicate any causal processes or 
mechanisms.6 
One way to understand the argument from complementarity is to make a distinction between causal 
explanations and interpretations of cognitive phenomena. Insofar as cognitive science provides causal 
explanations for cognitive phenomena in terms of universal properties and mechanisms, then cognitive 
sociology in Zerubavel’s sense seeks to complement cognitive science by providing interpretive 
accounts of those cognitive phenomena that vary between different groups and cultures. Hence, the 
focus in cognitive sociology seems to be on explicating the socially shared meanings of cognitive 
phenomena in different cultures and groups rather than on identifying the cognitive causal mechanisms 
that contribute to social phenomena. This also appears to be the reason why cognitive sociologists rely 
on case study designs and qualitative methods in their empirical studies. The interpretive emphasis of 
the argument from complementarity clearly separates it from the above arguments which both 
emphasize the need to provide scientific explanations for social phenomena, not just interpretations of 
them. 
Unlike these three arguments, the argument from constraints does not presuppose a specific approach 
to scientific explanation or interpretation. It is also more interactive than any of the other arguments. 
                                                        
6 The mechanistic and unification approaches to explanation also seem to presuppose a different concept of causation but 
we do not address this issue here. 
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The argument acknowledges not only that cognitive sciences should constrain social scientists’ 
assumptions about cognitive phenomena but also that social sciences should constrain cognitive 
scientists’ assumptions about social phenomena. Although Bloch nearly exclusively focuses on the 
influence of the cognitive sciences on the social sciences, the interdisciplinary traffic to the other 
direction is implied in his argument. In other words, cognitive scientists’ assumptions about social 
phenomena should also be constrained by the robust findings of the social sciences since cognitive 
scientists tend to lack the proper theoretical frameworks and empirical methods to make sense of social 
phenomena.  
In our view, the argument from explanatory grounding and the argument from constraints make the 
most compelling cases for the cognitive social sciences. These two arguments are genuinely integrative 
in the sense that they indicate promising ways in which the cognitive and social sciences can be brought 
together. Although the argument from constraints can be seen as to offer guidelines towards the 
explanatory grounding of social phenomena in the knowledge provided by the cognitive sciences, there 
are good reasons, as was shown above, to re-interpret the latter argument in a piecemeal manner that 
encourages two-way traffic between these two types of disciplines. In contrast to these two arguments, 
the argument from theoretical unification is able to unify the cognitive and social sciences only at the 
expense of large portions of both of these sciences being either rejected or ignored. We do not find this 
type of grand theoretical unification a feasible goal for the cognitive social sciences although we are 
open to the possibility that the cognitive social sciences may locally unify some social phenomena that 
are studied in different research fields of the current social sciences. Also the argument from 
complementarity seems counterproductive to the cognitive social sciences since it defends prevailing 
disciplinary boundaries rather than provides reasons for crossing them. 
Finally, we think that Sun’s version of the argument from explanatory grounding needs to be revised in 
two respects. First, a more externalist (or “wide”) understanding of cognition than that assumed in 
Sun’s argument is needed in order to provide explanatory grounding for many social phenomena that 
are studied in the social sciences since these phenomena involve cognitive processes that have social 
or cultural aspects. Although there is no consensus about the definition of cognition among the 
advocates of the externalist approaches in cognitive science—such as those developed in 4E cognition 
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approaches7 as well as situated and distributed cognition approaches—, it is clear that this growing 
family of externalist approaches challenges what Stephen Turner (2018, 45–51) calls “the standard 
approach” to cognitive science. The standard approach is internalist in the sense that it requires that 
all cognitive processes are realized in the brain (or in the central nervous system) and relies on some 
version of the brain-computer metaphor. However, it remains to be seen to what extent these 
externalist approaches are able to transform cognitive sciences in a way that makes social and cultural 
aspects of cognition more prominent in the mainstream cognitive sciences (for an interesting discussion 
of the various issues involved in this debate, see Turner, 2018).  
Second, we need a context-sensitive version of the mechanistic approach to explanation in order to 
explicate the explanatory grounding relations between the social and cognitive sciences. Although the 
mechanistic approach has emphasized the multilevel nature of mechanism-based explanations in the 
life sciences (e.g. Craver & Darden, 2013), when this model of explanation has been applied in the 
cognitive and social sciences, there has been a tendency to focus mostly on underlying mechanisms 
that have been assumed to provide the micro-foundations for higher level cognitive and social 
phenomena (Bechtel, 2009; Kaidesoja, 2013). Even though we do not deny the importance of studying 
the micro-foundations of cognitive and social phenomena in terms of their underlying mechanisms, in 
many cases the broader contexts of these mechanisms, including the higher level mechanisms that 
affect the operations of their component mechanisms, are equally important when it comes to 
providing mechanistic explanations to cognitive and social phenomena (e.g. Bechtel, 2009; Kaidesoja, 
2013; Miłkowski et al., 2018). This is especially the case when we are interested in cognitive phenomena 
that involve important social and cultural aspects which are highlighted by externalist approaches to 
cognition. Our next task is to develop this kind of mechanistic approach for the cognitive social 
sciences.8 
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